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I. INTRODUCTION
Although investigative journalists have been quick to realize
the value of the Florida Public Records Act (Act),' attorneys have
yet to fully recognize its value as a discovery device in private tort
and administrative litigation against the state or agencies acting on
behalf of the state.' Expansion of governmental regulation and the
Florida Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Florida's statu-
tory waiver of sovereign immunity' has opened the proverbial
"flood-gates" of tort litigation against the state. These actions have
enhanced the Act's value as a discovery tool.
A. Potential Application of the Act
The Act's potential application is seen in the types of cases
* The author is presently a partner in the litigation firm of Rossman, Baumberger and
Peltz, P.A., of Miami and a former Editor of the University of Miami Law Review.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.12 (1983).
2. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
3. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
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spawned by the Florida Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
Florida's statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. Since 1980, the
courts have recognized causes of action against the state for failure
to perform the following functions: enforce building codes4 and ele-
vator inspection regulations,5 maintain existing traffic control de-
vices and highways,' install appropriate warning devices at railroad
crossings and bridges,8 properly design intersections,9 inspect
highway systems, 10 maintain sidewalks," supervise public school
students both at school and during after school activities,1 2 hire or
retain teachers, 3 properly design bus stops,14 prevent dangerous
inmates from escaping state mental hospitals,1" direct traffic" and
investigate traffic violations,1 7 use reasonable care in construction
and maintenance of jails," prevent jail inmates from committing
suicide,"9 and warn sunbathers of the lack of supervision over ve-
hicular traffic on Daytona's beaches.2 0
B. The Advantages of Using the Act
In each of these cases, the Florida Public Records Act offers
private litigants distinct advantages over the discovery tools avail-
able under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The most obvious
advantage is that potential litigants may use the Act to obtain the
production of valuable documents before a lawsuit is even filed. 1
4. Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 423 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA
1982); Jones v. City of Longwood, 404 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
5. Bryan v. State, 438 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
6. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982).
7. Department of Transp. v. Webb, 409 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), cert. denied,
419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982).
8. Savignac v. Department of Transp., 406 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
9. Banta v. Rosier, 399 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
10. City of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
11. City of S. Miami v. Pytel, 412 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
12. Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982); Bryant v. School Bd., 399 So. 2d 417
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Rupp v.
Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982).
13. Willis v. Dade County School Bd., 411 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
14. School Bd. v. Surette, 394 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
15. Bellavance v. State, 390 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d
1145 (Fla. 1981).
16. Weissburg v. City of Miami Beach, 383 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
17. Walston v. Florida Highway Patrol, 429 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
18. White v. Palm Beach County, 404 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
19. Overby v. Wille, 411 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
20. Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 412 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
21. See FiA STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1983) ("Every person who has custody of public
records shall permit the records to be inspected and examined by any person desiring to do
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This allows the litigant the opportunity to fully prepare and build
its case before its opponent even knows there is a case. The Act
may also be used to obtain information from state agencies prior to
filing suit against a private third party.2 2 For example, litigants can
obtain the results of investigations by police, building inspectors,
and other types of law enforcement agencies; studies by the De-
partment of Transportation; or complaints of prior accidents or de-
fects made to a variety of state officials and departments. More-
over, because some evidence can be discovered only through the
use of subpoena power or other compulsory court process, the Act
gives the attorney a means of obtaining information without the
risks associated with filing a lawsuit.
Another advantage of the Act is that its scope is much broader
than that of traditional discovery devices. Requests under the Act
are not subject to the limitations on the scope of discovery set
forth in Rule 1.280(b)(1) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which limit discovery to information that is "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 23 Thus, a public
record holder may not object to a request for documents on the
basis that the records are irrelevant or immaterial, allowing the re-
questing party to go on broad "fishing expeditions" without
limitation.2 4
Rule 1.280(c), which empowers the trial court to restrict dis-
covery to prevent annoyance or embarrassment, does not limit dis-
closure under the Act. Recent cases have not only rejected the
claims of exemption based upon potential embarrassment or Flor-
ida's constitutional privacy amendment25 but have also held that
individuals named in public records do not have the right to re-
ceive notice of the request for records.2 Other differences between
the scope of disclosure under the Florida Public Records Act and
discovery under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, especially in
the areas of privileges, are discussed in more detail throughout this
so, at reasonable times. ... ) (emphasis added).
22. See id. § 119.011(1)-(2).
23. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.280(b)(1).
24. See, e.g., Orange County v. Florida Land Co., 450 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
("[A]ccess to public records is a matter of substance rather than practice and procedure and
therefore the Act takes precedence over the rule of procedure.") (citing Hillsborough County
Aviation Auth. v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 436 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)).
25. Forsberg v. Housing Auth., 455 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); see also Michel
v. Douglas, 1985 FLA. L. WEEKLY 129 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 1985) ("We find, howver, that the
right of access to personnel records is not the right to rummage freely through public em-
ployee's personal lives.").
26. Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 1984).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
article.2
The Act may also be used to offset delays resulting from the
administrative claims procedure, a condition precedent to filing a
tort action against the sovereign pursuant to section 768.28 of the
Florida Statutes." The tort claimant can use the Act to conduct
discovery during the six months in which the agency has to con-
sider the claim.2 9
II. SCOPE OF THE ACT
A. Specific Provisions on the Act's Applicability
Section 119.01(1) unambiguously sets forth the legislative in-
tent in enacting the Florida Public Records Act: "It is the policy of
this state that all state, county, and municipal records shall at all
times be open for a personal inspection by any person."3 0 The
nondiscretionary nature of the Act is further emphasized by the
mandatory language used in section 119.07(1)(a) which orders that:
"Every person who has custody of public records shall permit the
records to be inspected and examined by any person desiring to do
so .... , Section 119.02 removes any doubt concerning the
mandatory nature of the Act. It states: "Any public official who
shall violate the provisions of s. 119.07(1) shall be subject to sus-
pension and removal or impeachment and, in addition, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as pro-
vided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. ' ' "2 Public records subject to dis-
closure under the Act include "all documents, papers, letters,
maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other
material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or re-
ceived pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the
transaction of official business by any agency." 3
B. Case Law Interpreting the Act's Scope
Courts construing the Act have reinforced this extremely
broad definition by interpreting it to include virtually any record,
regardless of form, prepared in connection with agency business
27. See infra notes 62, 93 and accompanying text.
28. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1983).
29. Id. § 768.28 (6)(a).
30. Id. § 119.01(1) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 119.07(1)(a) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 119.02.
33. Id. § 119.011(1) (emphasis added).
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and intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowl-
edge.3 4 Courts have held that public records include accident and
investigative reports,3 5 and experts' reports;36 informal intra-office
memoranda,"7  correspondence,38  budget proposals and work
sheets;" personnel files of teachers, police, physicians and other
county employees;40 records of grievance proceedings, 41 grand jury
presentments describing acts of police misconduct,42 medical re-
view committee minutes,43 private attorneys' litigation files44 and
even information stored on a computer.
The broad scope given to the statutory term "agency" has fur-
ther extended the Act's applicability.4 " Agencies subject to the dis-
closure provisions of the Act include "any state, county, district,
authority, or municipal officer, department, division, board, bu-
reau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or
established by law and any other public or private agency, person,
partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any
public agency.' 47 Courts have held that this definition encom-
passes private attorneys,48 private consulting firms4 9 and other pri-
vate business entities retained to represent or assist governmental
units in carrying out their functions. 50
Courts have addressed the issue of when a private business en-
34. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
35. Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), reh'g denied, 426 So. 2d 27
(Fla. 1983); State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977),
cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978).
36. Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
37. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
38. Id.
39. City of Gainesville v. State ex rel. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local No. 2157, 298
So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
40. News-Press Publishing Co. v. Wisher, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977); Tribune Co. v.
Cannella, 438 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), quashed, 458 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984); Gadd v.
News-Press Publishing Co. (Gadd II), 412 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
41. Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 438 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA (1983), quashed, 458 So. 2d
1075 (Fla. 1984).
42. Id.
43. Gadd II, 412 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
44. Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), reh'g denied, 426 So. 2d 27
(Fla. 1983).
45. Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
47. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1983) (emphasis added).
48. Donner v. Edelstein (Donner 1), 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam).
49. Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); see also Fritz v. Nor-
flor Constr. Co., 386 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
50. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983).
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tity is "acting on behalf of" a public agency, subjecting the busi-
ness to the provisions of Florida's Public Records Act. These cases
make it clear that merely contracting with an agency is insufficient
to bring the entity within the Act."' The critical element found in
each is that the services "contracted for" formed an integral part
of the agency's chosen process for decisionmaking.52 Even with pri-
vate entities acting in this capacity, however, disclosure is only
permitted as to those functions performed on behalf of the govern-
mental agency"' and not for all aspects of private business.
The courts have been quick to quash schemes designed to cir-
cumvent the Act. In Tober v. Sanchez,5 4 the Third District Court
of Appeal held that the custodian of the records could not avoid
disclosure under the Act by transferring physical custody of the
records from the agency's official records custodian to a state or
county attorney.55 The court went even further in the case of Don-
ner v. Edelstein (Donner 1),56 by holding that "an assistant city
attorney of the City of Miami and a private attorney employed by
the City to represent it in connection with certain pending litiga-
tion brought . . . against the City, were custodians of public
records (that is, files and papers, relating to such litigation)
... 9$5 A 1984 amendment to section 119.11 of the Act has codi-
fied these holdings by providing that upon the filing of a civil ac-
tion to enforce disclosure, the records custodian "shall not transfer
custody, alter, destroy, or otherwise dispose of the public record
sought to be inspected and examined ....
The courts have also rejected agency efforts to delay the re-
lease of records. In Tribune Co. v. Cannella,59 the Second District
Court of Appeal initially struck down a Tampa Police Department
policy of postponing compliance with requests under the Act for
51. Id.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974) (constru-
ing Florida's Sunshine Law); Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel.
Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Shevin v.
Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980); Schwartzman v. Mer-
ritt Island Volunteer Fire Dep't, 352 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.
2d 132 (Fla. 1978).
53. See Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
54. 417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
55. Id. at 1054-55.
56. 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
58. 1984 Fla. Laws ch. 84-298, § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.11(4) (Supp. 1984)).
59. 438 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (per curiam), quashed, 458 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.
1984).
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three days, holding that all requests must be answered within
forty-eight hours." The Florida Supreme Court quashed the dis-
trict court opinion and held that any automatic delay for a specific
period of time, even of only forty-eight hours, was impermissible
under the Act."
III. EXEMPTIONS
Neither the motivation of the person seeking disclosure of
public records, nor the reason for which they are being sought, may
form the basis for an exemption from disclosure.2 Thus, pending
litigation between the record seeker and the record holder will not
act to exempt the requested records. This is true even where the
records are essential to the litigation and would be otherwise privi-
leged under the applicable rules of discovery. 3 Even when litiga-
tion is pending, the scope of disclosure under the Florida Public
Records Act is not to be equated with those documents discovera-
ble under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.6 4
A. The Act's Specific Exemptions
Section 119.07(3)(a) of the Act spells out a number of specific
types of documents generally dealing with ongoing criminal inves-
tigation or intelligence-type records and also states that "[a]ll pub-
lic records which are presently provided by law to be confidential
or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public,
whether by general or special law, are exempt from [disclosure]
... "6 Florida courts have construed this provision in accordance
with the Act's overall intent holding that it neither recognizes nor
permits judicially created exemptions. One court stated that
"[t]he legislature intended to exempt those public records made
confidential by statutory law and not those documents which are
60. Id. at 522.
61. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075. The court further held that employees whose records are
being sought under the Act do not have the right to be present during the requested inspec-
tion nor are they even required to be notified that an inspection of their records has been
requested. Id. at 1078.
62. See News-Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd (Gadd I), 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980); State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Warden v. Bennett, 340 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
63. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979); Tober v. Sanchez,
417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Donner 1, 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per
curiam); Warden v. Bennett, 340 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
64. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
65. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a) (1983).
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confidential or privileged only as a result of the judicially created
privileges . "..."66
B. Florida Evidence Code: Broadening the Act's Exemptions?
Prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code, case law
made it clear that even where litigation was pending at the time of
the request, neither the work-product nor attorney-client privileges
would act to exempt documents from disclosure under the Florida
Public Records Act.67 In the absence of a specific statutory exemp-
tion, it has been further held that the courts may not deny disclos-
ure based upon public policy considerations that attempt to weigh
the relative significance of the public's interest in disclosure with
the damage to an individual institution resulting from such
disclosure."
Some uncertainty has arisen as a result of the adoption of the
Florida Evidence Code, because section 90.502 of the Code recog-
nizes in general terms the attorney-client privilege.6" The First
District Court of Appeal in City of Williston v. Roadlander,70 as-
sumed in dicta that the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code cre-
ated an exemption to disclosure for documents falling within the
attorney-client privilege without specifically considering the ques-
tion.71 On the other hand, the Federal District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida in City of Tampa v. Titan Southeast Con-
struction Corp.,7" relying on an absence of state authority at the
time, squarely held that the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code
did create such an exemption.73
In three subsequent decisions, however, the Third District
Court of Appeal in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of North
Miami,7 4 State v. Kropf,7 6 and Edelstein v. Donner 7  expressly
66. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979) (emphasis
added); see also Gadd II, 412 So. 2d 894, 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) ("Public policy considera-
tions, aside from statutory or constitutional rights, can no longer be urged as an exemption
to the Public Records Law.").
67. Rose v. D'Alessandro, 380 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1980); Wait v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979); Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State
ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied 360
So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
68. Gadd I, 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
69. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1983).
70. 425 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
71. Id. at 1177 (dicta).
72. 535 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (mem.).
73. Id. at 166.
74. 452 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The Supreme Court of Florida in City of N.
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held that section 90.502 of the Evidence Code did not create an
exemption for the disclosure of documents under the Act. In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Third District noted that the statutory ex-
emptions permitted under section 119.07(2)(a) and section
119.07(3)(a) of the Act relate to exemptions by that the Legislature
enacted in specific response to the provisions of the Act.7 7 Thus,
they are directed solely to the nondisclosure of public records, un-
like the Florida Evidence Code, which is merely a general codifica-
tion of judicially created rules of evidence applicable in all civil
trials. 8
The Third District in Miami Herald Publishing Co. drew par-
allels between the Florida Public Records Act and the Florida Sun-
shine Law. Under Florida's Sunshine Law, the Third District had
previously held that a meeting between the North Miami city
council and its city attorney must be opened to the public despite
a claim of attorney-client privilege.80 The Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. court concluded that because there was no attorney-client
exception to the Sunshine Law, the Legislature intended none for
its sister statute-the Florida Public Records Act through the
Florida Evidence Code.81
The court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. finally noted that
between 1979 and 1983 the Florida Legislature had rejected seven
bills attempting to create an attorney-client exemption to the Flor-
ida Public Records Act."2 Relying on the Florida Supreme Court's
prior admonitions that exemptions to the Act could only be cre-
ated by the legislature,"8 the Third District concluded that the leg-
islature did not intend to bar disclosure under the attorney-client
privilege. 4
Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 10 FLA. L. W. 183 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 1985) answered
"no" to the certified question from the district court of appeal: "Does the lawyer-client priv-
ilege section of the Florida Evidence Code exempt from the disclosure requirements of the
Public Records Act written communications between a lawyer and his public-entity client?"
10 FLA. L. W. at 184; 452 So. 2d at 574.
75. 445 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
76. 450 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (per curiam).
77. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 452 So. 2d at 573; see Edelstein, 450 So. 2d at 562;
Kropff, 445 So. 2d at 1069.
78. FLA. STAT. § 90.103(2) (1983).
79. Id. § 286.011.
80. State ex rel. Reno v. Neu, 434 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
81. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 452 So. 2d at 573.
82. Id. at 574 n.3.
83. E.g., Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979).
84. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 452 So. 2d at 573-74. The Third District's identical
holdings in Edelstein, 450 So. 2d at 562, and Kropff, 445 So. 2d at 1069, were based entirely
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
It should also be noted that the Florida Evidence Code was
initially enacted in 197685 and had an original effective date of July
1, 1977.86 This was long before two supreme court decisions87 and
two district court decisions, 88 which all specifically rejected an ex-
emption based upon the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the
decisions in Rose and Gadd I were rendered after the Florida Evi-
dence Code's final effective date of July 1, 1979.89
C. The 1984 Amendment
Effective October 1, 1984, the Legislature added subsection (o)
to section 119.07(3) of the Act, exempting documents constituting
work product from disclosure.9 0 The amendment, however, did not
provide an exemption based upon the attorney-client privilege,
thus further strengthening the Third District's argument that such
a claim of exemption is not recognized under the Act."' Although
the definition of documents comprising "work product" under new
subsection 119.07(3)(o) parallels the common law definition, it is
important to note that such documents are exempt only "until the
conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceed-
ings. ' 9 2 In this sense, the work product privilege under the Florida
Public Records Act is narrower than that recognized under the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, because case law under the rules
has held that documents constituting work product in prior litiga-
tion remain privileged as work product in subsequent litigation,
even though it involves different parties. 8 This distinction can
have important ramifications in cases where notice of a defect or
prior conduct is relevant, because a plaintiff using the Act will still
be able to obtain statements, experts' reports and other "work
product" materials relating to prior accidents or lawsuits.
on Miami Herald Publishing Co..
85. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 90.101-.958 (1983)).
86. Id. § 8.
87. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979); Rose v.
D'Alessandro, 380 So. 2d 419 (Fja. 1980).
88. State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Gadd I, 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
89. In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1979).
90. 1984 Fla. Laws ch. 84-298, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (Supp. 1984)).
91. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
92. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o)(1) (Supp. 1984).
93. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Limeburner, 390 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980).
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D. Exemption Under Section 284.40
Section 284.40 of the Florida Statutes pertaining to the Divi-
sion of Risk Management contains another exemption applicable
to tort litigation. This exemption was first considered in State v.
Kropf f. This statute provides that claim files maintained by the
Division of Risk Management are privileged and confidential and
are only for use by the Department of Insurance in fulfilling its
responsibilities in providing insurance to state agencies. Although
holding that this section created an exemption under the Act, the
court in Kropff warned that the exemption only applied "within
the limits prescribed by Tober v. Sanchez."" This reference to
Tober referred to the portion of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal's holding in Tober that custodians of public records could not
avoid disclosure under the Act by transferring the physical custody
of the records to some other party, such as an attorney. 7 There-
fore Kropff appears to stand for the proposition that while records
ordinarily maintained by the Division of Risk Management are ex-
empt from disclosure, records held by other entities cannot be ex-
empted from disclosure by transferring their physical possession to
the Division of Risk Management.
IV. PROCEDURE UNDER THE ACT
A. Generally
Section 119.07(1)(a) of the Act sets forth the only procedure in
the Act to invoke disclosure of the public records:
Every person who has custody of public records shall permit the
records to be inspected and examined by any person desiring to
do so, at reasonable times, under reasonable conditions, and
under supervision by the custodian of the records or his desig-
nee. The custodian shall furnish copies or certified copies of the
records upon payment of fees as prescribed by law or, if fees are
not prescribed by law, upon payment of the actual cost of dupli-
cation of the copies.9
The Act does not establish any specific procedures that must
be followed by persons seeking disclosure. The Act does not even
94. FLA. STAT. § 284.40 (1983).
95. 445 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 1069 (citation omitted).
97. Tober, 417 So. 2d at 1054.
98. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1983).
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require that the request be in writing. Case law has further inter-
preted the "reasonable conditions" language of this section to pro-
hibit creation of conditions precedent to disclosure and to allow
only reasonable regulations to protect the records from alteration,
damage or destruction." Where the nature or volume of the
records requires extensive clerical or supervisory assistance by
agency personnel, the agency is permitted to add to the actual cost
of copying a reasonable charge for the personnel providing the ser-
vice.' 00 Such a charge, however, must be based upon the actual sal-
ary rate of the personnel involved.' 01
B. The Records Custodian
The Act sets forth the procedure to be followed by the custo-
dian of the public records when an exemption is asserted. In such
cases, the records custodian is required to produce all records re-
quested, excepting those portions of specific records for which an
exemption is claimed.' 0 2 The records custodian is also required to
state in writing the basis of the exemption "including the statutory
citation . . . and, if requested . . .[in] particularity the reasons for
his conclusion that the record is exempt."' 08 '
C. Judicial Involvement
The Act does not provide for the judicial mechanism to be
used when a dispute over disclosure arises. In practice, however, a
petition for a writ of mandamus is the most common method
used. 04 When court action is necessary to compel disclosure, sec-
tion 119.12 of the Act provides that the requesting party shall re-
cover reasonable attorney fees if the refusal to disclose records has
been unreasonable.' 0 5
The Act only requires an in-camera inspection of documents
by the court when the claimed exemption is based upon section
119.07(3)(e), (f), (g), or (m).' 0 1 None of these exemptions, however,
99. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979).
100. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(I)(b) (1983).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 119.07(2)(a).
103. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (Supp. 1984).
104. See, e.g., Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1979); State
ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied,
360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978).
105. FLA. STAT. § 119.12 (1983).
106. Id. § 119.07(2)(b) (1983). The four types of exemptions that require in-camera in-
spection by § 119.07(2)(b) are: § 119.07(3)(e) (records revealing the identity of confidential
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relates to the bulk of tort litigation. Nevertheless, in a long line of
decisions beginning with Donner I, the Third District Court of Ap-
peal has made such inspections mandatory in all cases.1 07
D. Procedure When Litigation is Pending
The Act does not address the procedure to request records
when litigation is pending at the time of the request. It is axio-
matic that when litigation is pending the attorney for one party
may not ethically communicate directly with the adverse party,
but instead must communicate through the adverse party's attor-
ney.1 08 Accordingly, the proper course under such circumstances
should require that the public records requests be submitted to the
agency's attorney, rather than through the agency's records custo-
dian. This procedure would also prevent uninformed agency per-
sonnel from producing records which the attorney might intend to
invoke a valid claim of exemption.
Assuming that the request in such circumstances should go di-
rectly to the agency's attorney, the next question that arises is the
form of the request. Because the Act requires no specific form of
request, it would appear that the records could be requested by
either a request to produce or a subpoena. There are advantages to
both parties in this procedure. First, it puts the agency's attorney
dealing with the specific problem on immediate notice of the re-
quest. Secondly, it provides a quick and inexpensive forum to de-
cide disputes over disclosure within the framework of the existing
lawsuit. Because a prime purpose of the Act is to provide for the
speedy and inexpensive disclosure of public records,10' this method
of proceeding through the discovery mechanism allows the request-
ing party to avoid the delays and costs inherent in filing a writ of
mandamus in a separate lawsuit.
The only court to consider such a procedure is the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in State v. Kropff."0 In Kropff, the plaintiff
filed a notice ot taking deposition pursuant.to Rule 1.310(b)(5),
informants), (f) (records revealing surveillance techniques), (g) (records revealing under-
cover personnel of any criminal justice agency), (m) (records revealing the substance of con-
fessions or witness lists, until disposition of charge).
107. See, e.g., State v. Kropff, 445 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. City of N. Miami, 420 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Donner v. Edelstein
(Donner I), 423 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam) (on motion for order in accor-
dance with mandate); Donner 1, 415 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
108. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(a)(1) (1980).
109. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1983).
110. 445 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
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Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the "noticing" of a
corporation or other entity."' The notice of deposition was accom-
panied by a notice of production directing the defendant Florida
Highway Patrol to bring the public records, subject to disclosure
under the Act, to the deposition. The court was critical of the pro-
cedure but expressly refused to decide its propriety.1 2
V. CONCLUSION
State agencies have argued that the Florida Public Records
Act places them at a disadvantage in situations involving litigation,
but their argument ignores a number of overriding policy consider-
ations. State agencies are given many advantages over private liti-
gants under section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes. 3 Under this
statute, a private litigant must undergo the expense and often-
times substantial delay in filing an administrative claim as a condi-
tion precedent to instituting a lawsuit."" As the case law makes
clear, this path is frought with many dangers and failure to comply
with technicalities can result in an absolute denial of the right to
file a lawsuit. This is true, even though the state agency has suf-
fered no prejudice as a result of the technical violation." 5 Section
768.28 also sets a cap on the damages that are recoverable against
the state in the absence of insurance. Therefore, if a state agency
decides not to insure itself, litigants will be limited to damages of
$50,000 or $100,000, per person, depending upon the date of their
accident. 6
Perhaps, more importantly, the interest of the state in civil
litigation cases cannot be equated with that of a private individual.
When the state litigates with a private individual, it is involved
with one of its own citizens and therefore the proceeding cannot be
termed "adversary" in the same sense as a suit between two pri-
vate individuals. In a case construing the companion Sunshine
Law, the Third District Court of Appeal observed, "representative
government requires that [government] be responsive to the wishes
of the governed, because that is its ultimate source of consent."" 17
This principle is more often seen in criminal than in civil
111. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(5).
112. Kropff, 445 So. 2d at 1068 n.1.
113. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1983).
114. Id. § 768.28(6)(a).
115. Levine v. Dade County School Bd., 419 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
116. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1983).
117. Krause v. Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244, 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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cases. Although in the criminal context, most procedural rules are
constitutionally mandated, the additional burdens placed on the
state in criminal proceedings demonstrates the difference in the
nature of a proceeding between private litigants and a proceeding
between a private party and the state.
In criminal proceedings, for example, far broader obligations
of disclosure are imposed upon the state than the defense, includ-
ing the duty to disclose all material evidence that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused. " 8 In fact, it has often been observed that
"[t]he state's attorney is not an attorney of record for the state
striving at all events to win a verdict of guilty. He is a quasi judi-
cial officer whose main objective should always be to serve justice
and see that every defendant received a fair trial.""' 9 It has also
been commented that "[t]he State prosecutor has an affirmative
duty to correct what he knows to be false and to elicit the truth.
Even though the State itself does not solicit the false evidence, it
may not allow it to go uncorrected when it appears."120
This same rationale applies to civil cases and to the role of the
Florida Public Records Act. The purpose of the state is not self
profit or self perpetuation, but rather the state's purpose is to
serve the broad interests of its citizens. As further observed by the
Florida Supreme Court, "[a] search for truth and justice can be
accomplished only when all relevant facts are before the judicial
tribunal. Those relevant facts should be the determining factor
rather than gamesmanship, surprise, or superior trial tactics."',' It
is only through the liberal construction of the disclosure require-
ments of the Act given by the courts to date that these purposes
can be accomplished.
118. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
103B (1980).
119. Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (footnote omitted).
120. Lee v. State, 324 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (citation and emphasis
omitted).
121. Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1980).
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